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A TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
MICHAEL S. MCGINNISS*

ABSTRACT
This Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia is based on remarks originally
presented on Wednesday, April 6, 2016 in the UND School of Law Central
Commons, for our School of Law’s law-related discussion series called
“The Buzz.”
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INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon. It is my great pleasure and truly a privilege to be with
you today to pay tribute to the public life and legacy of United States
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who passed away in February at the
age of seventy-nine. I serve as the faculty advisor for the School of Law’s
chapter of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy (a national
organization of which Justice Scalia was supportive from the time of its
founding in the 1980s).1 I am also a law teacher, a legal scholar, a member
of the legal profession, and a person who has been inspired by Justice
Scalia and his example since even before I started law school almost
twenty-six years ago. The views I will express to you today are entirely my
own.
To open a window of insight into Justice Scalia’s legacy, I would like
to show you a short video that was prepared by the national Federalist
Society in honor of Justice Scalia after his passing.2
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVE
Michael W. McConnell is a law professor and the director of the
Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School.3 He served for a
number of years on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and in the 2000s he
was on President George W. Bush’s short list for the Supreme Court.4
When he was a younger law professor, and when I was a younger law
student at William & Mary, I had the privilege of meeting Professor
McConnell. While he was visiting the law school for its annual Supreme
Court symposium, he took the time out of his busy schedule to meet with
our Christian Law Fellowship for a Bible study (at his suggestion, on the
Old Testament Book of Haggai) and some encouragement on being a

1. See A Tribute to Justice Scalia, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.fedsoc.org/multimedia/detail/a-tribute-to-justice-scalia. In fact, when he was a law professor at the
University of Chicago, he was the original faculty advisor to their student chapter of the Federalist
Society. Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court Justice and Former UChicago Law Professor,
1936-2016 (Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/antonin-scalia-us-supreme-courtjustice-and-former-uchicago-law-professor-1936-2016.
2.
The Federalist Society’s tribute video is available at http://www.fedsoc.org/multimedia/detail/a-tribute-to-justice-scalia.
3. Michael W. McConnell Biography, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, https://law.stanford.edu/
directory/michael-w-mcconnell/ (last visited July 29, 2016).
4. See Neil A. Lewis, Court in Transition; Supreme Court Short List, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5,
2005),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9901E6D61431F936A3575AC0A9639C8B63.
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person of faith in the legal profession.5 He is a wonderful man and a
tremendously accomplished and renowned legal scholar.6 In a Wall Street
Journal piece published after Justice Scalia’s passing, Professor McConnell
shared the following thoughts on the Justice’s legacy:
Antonin Scalia . . . was the most influential Supreme Court justice
of the past 30 years. Not because he had the votes. He was
influential because he had a clear, consistent, persuasive idea of
how to interpret the Constitution: It means what it says; it means
what those who enacted it meant to enact. And Justice Scalia was
influential because he wrote opinions with verve and good sense,
in prose that any American could read and understand. He was the
best writer the Supreme Court has ever known—and with justices
like John Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Robert Jackson,
that is saying a lot. He was the court’s most withering logician. He
showed us what a real judge can be, even on that most political
court.7
Professor McConnell acknowledges that “Justice Scalia’s text-andhistory approach to constitutional interpretation sounds wonkish.”8 He
asks, “How can the attractions of text and history compare with getting
quick national victories” on highly contested matters of law?9 But he
observes that “text and history are about more than fastidious jurisprudence.
They are about democracy: allowing Americans to decide contentious
questions for themselves, where the Constitution is, honestly read, silent.”10

5. The Book of Haggai consists of a series of prophetic messages to the people of Israel after
their return from exile. Professor McConnell’s remarks and our discussion focused on a passage
that includes these verses:
Now therefore says the LORD of hosts: Consider how you have fared. You have
sown much, and harvested little; you eat, but you never have enough; you drink, but
you never have your fill; you clothe yourselves, but no one is warm; and you that earn
wages earn wages to put them into a bag with holes.
Haggai 1:5-6 (NRSV). I warmly recall how masterfully Professor McConnell applied this
passage to our experiences as law students, called to persevere in our work and make sacrifices to
achieve our goals, without losing sight of the purposes of God in our lives both then and in the
future.
6. For an insightful profile of Professor McConnell, see Jamshid Ghazi Askar, Scholar
Michael W. McConnell Mixes Law, Religion, DESERET NEWS (Jan. 9, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700099094/Scholar-Michael-W-McConnell-mixes-lawreligion.html?pg=all.
7. Michael W. McConnell, Antonin Scalia Was Democracy’s Legal Champion, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 14, 2016, 3:46 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/antonin-scalia-was-democracys-legalchampion-1455482790.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Justice Scalia believed this silence should be filled by the voices of the
people through their elected representatives, either through legislation or
constitutional amendments. The Court, in his approach, should not use
interpretation either to add to the constitutional text, to expand on the given
rights or create new ones, or to remove from the text or whittle down the
rights that it does create. Professor McConnell explains:
As Justice Scalia wrote in [one of his most famous dissents,]
Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), “if in reality our process of
constitutional adjudication consists primarily of making value
judgments,” instead of “doing essentially lawyers’ work up here—
reading text and discerning our society’s traditional understanding
of that text,” then the issue is properly one for democratic debate.
“The people know that their value judgments are quite as good as
those taught in any law school—maybe better.” After all, [Justice
Scalia] wrote, “value judgments should be voted on, . . . not
dictated [by nine unelected judges].”11
As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison,
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”12 But as Professor McConnell observes:
[I]f constitutional controversies are governed by something other
than law, if they are governed by “what the Court calls ‘reasoned
judgment,’ which turns out to be nothing but philosophical
predilection and moral intuition,” as Justice Scalia put it, there is
no reason judges should decide. In other words, it would not be the
province or duty of the judicial department to say what the law
should be, or to resolve disagreements about philosophy or
morality.13
There is no question that Justice Scalia was a conservative, both
judicially and in his personal views.14 And, as Professor McConnell notes,
it is also true that “the results of his text-and-history approach [to
constitutional interpretation] were often conservative. He believed in a
colorblind Constitution; . . . he defended the presence of religion in the

11. Id.
12. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
13. McConnell, supra note 7.
14. Id.; see also Ross Douthat, Antonin Scalia: Conservative Legal Giant, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
13,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/opinion/antonin-scalia-conservative-legalgiant.html?ref=opinion&_r=2 (observing that Justice Scalia’s “intellectual importance was
compounded by the way he strained to be consistent, to rule based on principle rather than on his
partisan biases — which made him stand out in an age when justices often seem as purely partisan
as any other office holder”).
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public square” under the Establishment Clause.15 He authored the Court’s
2008 milestone majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, reaffirming the historically-grounded understanding that the Second
Amendment does indeed confer “an individual right to keep and bear
arms.”16 And he opposed congressional attempts to silence core First
Amendment political speech rights through campaign finance prohibitions,
joining the Court’s critically important 2010 decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission protecting those rights.17
On First
Amendment freedom of speech, in opinions such as his brilliant 2000
dissent in Hill v. Colorado, he also spoke compellingly for the rights of prolife individuals to engage in peaceful protests, when, under the standards
articulated by a majority of his colleagues, such speech should be treated
less favorably based on its content and context and have special restrictions
imposed upon it.18
As much as I have long admired and looked up to Justice Scalia, I have
had my own disagreements with his judicial opinions from time to time.
For example, I believe he took too narrow a view of the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment in the 1990 Employment Division
v. Smith19 decision, a development which led to Congress’ adoption of the
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”)20 to protect
the rights of religious believers not merely to freely worship, but also to act
in their daily lives in accordance with their religious beliefs without
governmental interference unless the highest standards of strict scrutiny are
satisfied.21 Moreover, I think Justice Scalia tended to take too broad a view

15. McConnell, supra note 7; see, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 512 U.S. 577 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
16. 554 U.S 570, 595 (2008).
17. 558 U.S. 415 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
18. 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2016).
21. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2754 (2014) (Alito, J.,
majority opinion joined by Justice Scalia). Subsequent to Justice Scalia’s passing, his likely
fourth vote was keenly missed when the Court narrowly denied a petition for certiorari in
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 579 U.S. ___ (2016). Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Thomas, dissented vigorously and, sounding a note of alarm for the future, described
this denial as “an ominous sign” for religious freedom:
At issue are Washington State regulations that are likely to make a pharmacist
unemployable if he or she objects on religious grounds to dispensing certain prescription medications. There are strong reasons to doubt whether the regulations were
adopted for—or that they actually serve—any legitimate purpose. And there is much
evidence that the impetus for the adoption of the regulations was hostility to
pharmacists whose religious beliefs regarding abortion and contraception are out of
step with prevailing opinion in the State. Yet the Ninth Circuit held that the
regulations do not violate the First Amendment, and this Court does not deem the case
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of federal authority (and too narrow a view of state prerogatives) in cases
decided under the Erie/Hanna22 doctrine, which involves choice-of-stateor-federal law in the cases in federal court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure23 or Rule of Appellate
Procedure24 is involved. (Very interestingly, instead of Justice Scalia, it has
been Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg who has been hoisting the sail for Tenth
Amendment federalism and state law in the Erie/Hanna cases.25) And, in
some instances, I have thought that Justice Clarence Thomas or Justice
Samuel Alito had the better reasoning in cases in which they diverged from
Justice Scalia, whether by concurrence26 or in disagreement on the
judgment itself.27
But in each case involving constitutional interpretation, whether one
might agree or disagree when it comes to the underlying public policy
question at issue, Justice Scalia strove to call each case as he saw it based
simply on the Constitution and the original public meaning of its text.28 For
example, in the face of our Nation’s post-September 11 national security
challenges, he authored a dissenting opinion advocating habeas corpus
rights under the Constitution for American citizens detained as enemy

worthy of our time. If this is a sign of how religious liberty claims will be treated in
the years ahead, those who value religious freedom have cause for great concern.
Id. at 1; see Kelsey Harkness, A Supreme Court Justice’s Dire Warning for Those Who Value
Religious Freedom, THE DAILY SIGNAL (June 28, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/28/
justice-alito-those-who-value-religious-freedom-have-cause-for-great-concern; see also David F.
Forte, Religious Liberty After Scalia, FEDERALIST SOC’Y BLOG (May 6, 2016), http://www.fedsoc.org/blog/detail/religious-liberty-after-scalia; see generally MARY EBERSTADT, IT’S
DANGEROUS TO BELIEVE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND ITS ENEMIES (2016).
22. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
23. See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-73.
24. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co, v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 3 (1987).
25. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
majority opinion); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Compare also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.,
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) with id. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). See generally Glenn S. Koppel, The Fruits of Shady Grove: Seeing the Forest for the
Trees, 44 AKRON L. REV. 999 (2011).
26. See, e.g., Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment; majority opinion by Justice Scalia); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment;
majority opinion by Justice Alito joined by Justice Scalia).
27. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2262 (2013)
(Thomas, J., dissenting; majority opinion by Justice Scalia); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564
U.S. 786 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting; majority opinion by Justice Scalia); United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting; majority opinion by Chief Justice John
Roberts joined by Justice Scalia).
28. See generally SCALIA’S COURT: A LEGACY OF LANDMARK OPINIONS AND DISSENTS
(Kevin A. Ring ed., 2016); RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND
TRADITION (2006).
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combatants.29 He authored a significant number of the Court’s majority
opinions fortifying important safeguards for the rights of criminal suspects
and defendants.30 These included a series of landmark opinions decided
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment; students who
have taken my Evidence class will recall the landmark Justice Scalia
opinion in Crawford v. Washington.31 He also ruled in favor of strong
protections for the First Amendment freedom of speech, even (and, in fact,
especially) for speech and expressive conduct of the most offensive nature
(for example, the burning of an American flag).32
However, as Professor McConnell observes, on each question for
decision, Justice Scalia “offered reasons based on text and history, never on
his own philosophy or moral intuitions.”33 He did not assert either his
ability or his authority to read changes in the times among the body politic
or to discern what the “right side of history” is on a given question and
make judicial rulings on that basis. He consistently studied and offered his
legal interpretations in good faith as a judge who was appointed to
understand the law as it has been given, and not as a Platonic philosopherking to proclaim mandates of the law as he believed it should be. In the
constitutional republic designed by its Framers, effective separation of
powers is and always has been a necessity (1) as a protection against
tyranny, being a safeguard against the flaws of human nature by avoiding
the vesting of too much authority in one person or branch, and (2) as a
means of preserving, especially for those holding minority or unpopular
views, the promise of freedom when faced with shifts in popular sentiment.
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence constituted an essential call to conserve those
core principles and hold fast to their enduring protections.

29. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion was joined only by Justice John Paul Stevens. Id.
30. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
31. 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
32. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Brennan, J., majority opinion, joined by
Justice Scalia).
33. McConnell, supra note 7.
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III. “A JUSTICE IN FULL”34
When Justice Scalia passed away in February, there were many tributes
written and published about his life of public service, including by legal
scholars and others who very much disagreed with him on the outcomes of
his decisions and their jurisprudential approach.35 Yet very sadly, but not
surprisingly in our contentious and increasingly uncivil national culture,
there were also outbursts of venom and hatred—including on social media.
In an online op-ed in February, Yale Law Professor Stephen L. Carter, who
had the great honor of clerking for Justice Thurgood Marshall, recounted
with great dismay and disappointment some of these unfortunate
outpourings that expressed celebratory glee at Justice Scalia’s death.36 As
Professor Carter described these messages he received in his own Twitter
account, they were not simply “disagreement or disrespect . . . [They were]
actual hate. He was an ignorant waste of flesh, wrote one young fool. His
death was the best news in decades, cheered another. Then there was the
woman who just had to tell the world that she felt safer now than she had at
the death of Osama bin Laden. And several people expressed the hope the
hope! that Clarence Thomas would die next.”37 Professor Carter, after
recounting some of his recollections of Justice Marshall and the respect the
Justice had for his colleagues on the Court (including those who were
frequently in disagreement with him), concluded that “[t]o trash the justices
because we don’t like their votes (usually on a handful of issues) is to
diminish the majesty of the court itself. The more we do it, the less reason
there is for anybody to respect the justices when at last whichever side
we’re on has a majority.”38
This is such an important point and message not only for you as law
students, but also for the entire legal profession. In his own relationship
with his colleagues on the Court, particularly those with whom he had the
most frequent and significant disagreements about the law (including those
literally involving life and death), Justice Scalia modeled for us how this

34. Justice Scalia was so-described in the title of a National Review Online remembrance
symposium published soon after his passing. NRO Symposium, Antonin Scalia – A Justice in
Full, NAT’L REVIEW ONLINE (Feb. 29, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/
432005/antonin-scalia-supreme-court-justice-remembrances.
35. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, The Legacy of Antonin Scalia—The Unrelenting Provoker,
BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/02/17/the-legacyantonin-scalia-unrelenting-provoker/mH40dhHDvEPXCzyXCLfxqI/story.html.
36. Stephen L. Carter, Scalia’s Grave-Dancers Deserve a Harsh Verdict, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Feb. 14, 2016, 11:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-14/justicescalia-s-death-brings-out-the-worst-in-opponents.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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can and should be done. Yes, his dissenting opinions were often quite
scathing in his assessment of the majority’s conclusions and reasoning, and
on occasion his frustration in defeat on matters of core jurisprudential
import came through perhaps too bluntly.39 But in his professional and
personal relationships on the Court, his colleagues have long attested to his
caring concern, his humanity, and his joie de vivre and good humor. Most
famously, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Scalia were close
friends for decades, and greatly enjoyed each other’s company on many
outings and excursions together (including attending the opera, sharing
gourmet dinners at their homes, and making a vacation trip to Africa).40 In
a National Review remembrance symposium entitled “A Justice in Full,”
which contained personal memories about Justice Scalia from multiple
colleagues, friends, and family members, Justice Ginsburg told the
following stories:
[On] December 12, 2000, the day the Court decided Bush v. Gore,
I was in chambers, exhausted after the marathon: review granted
Saturday, briefs filed Sunday, oral argument Monday, opinions
completed and released Tuesday. Justice Scalia and I were on
opposite sides. The Court did the right thing, he had no doubt. I
disagreed and explained why in a dissenting opinion. Around 9
P.M. the telephone, my direct line, rang. It was Justice Scalia. He
didn’t say, “Get over it.” Instead, he asked, “Ruth, why are you
still at the Court? Go home and take a hot bath.” Good advice I
promptly followed.
Among my favorite Scalia stories [Justice Ginsburg recalled] is
that, when President Clinton was mulling over his first nomination
to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia was asked, “If you were
stranded on a desert island with a Court colleague, whom would
you prefer, Larry Tribe or Mario Cuomo?” Scalia answered

39. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing some of the prose in the Court’s 5-4 majority opinion creating a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage, by stating that if he had to accept such language in an opinion, “even as the
price to be paid for a fifth vote,” he would “hide [his] head in a bag”). Although I agree as a
matter of constitutional law with Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Obergefell, I also believe
this rhetorical choice detracted from, rather than enhanced, the power of his legal argument, and
that the other dissents (which Justice Scalia also joined) offered the most compelling and
convincing challenges to the legal analysis and conclusions of the majority opinion. Cf. id.
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
40. See Ariane de Vogue, Scalia-Ginsburg Friendship Bridged Opposing Ideologies, CNN
(Feb. 14, 2016, 10:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/14/politics/antonin-scalia-ruth-baderginsburg-friends.
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quickly and distinctly: “Ruth Bader Ginsburg.” Within days, the
president chose me.41
Justice Stephen Breyer, another colleague with whom Justice Scalia
often disagreed on the most controversial cases, told the following story in
the same symposium of remembrances:
We would sometimes debate our philosophical differences in
public, once before the Senate Judiciary Committee, once on a
football field before several hundred students in Lubbock, Texas.
He would explain the benefits of “originalism.” I would respond
that George Washington was not aware of the Internet. He would
reply, “Actually, I knew that.” And, sometimes conceding that
originalism, too, had imperfections, he would add that,
comparatively speaking, it’s like the camper who sees his friend
lacing up his running shoes: “What are you doing?” he asks.
“There’s a bear coming,” answers the friend. “You can’t outrun a
bear,” he replies. “True, but I can outrun you.”42
In a February online article published in The Public Discourse,
Princeton University and Harvard Law Visiting Professor Robert P. George
offered additional perspective on Justice Scalia’s personal qualities:
What was Nino Scalia like as a person? He was a man of limited
patience and great compassion. To say that he “did not suffer
fools gladly” would be an understatement. He had no tolerance for
slouchers, slackers, rent-seekers, time-servers, or free riders, and
he wouldn’t bend the law for anybody—even if he personally
believed the law too harsh. But as his friends of all political
persuasions unanimously attest, he was capable of great kindness
and generosity. He was a limited-government man, both as a
matter of political philosophy and constitutional law, but he deeply
believed in personal responsibility, including the duty of charity to
those who are suffering or in need.
A devout Catholic, Scalia neither hid nor flaunted his faith. When
asked about his beliefs, he spoke of his Christian commitments
with no hint of embarrassment. He was not ashamed of the
Gospel. In a widely publicized speech, he reminded his fellow
Christians of the teachings of St. Paul, urging them to “have the

41. NRO Symposium, supra note 34.
42. Id.
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courage to have your wisdom be regarded as stupidity: Be fools
for Christ.”43
IV. A PERSONAL REFLECTION
I never had the privilege of meeting Justice Scalia. But I do remember
how, when I attended law school at William & Mary from 1990 to 1993,
and he was serving his fourth through seventh of his eventual thirty years
on the Court, he powerfully shaped my learning and experiences as a law
student. If you will allow me, I would like to take this opportunity to share
some personal background and perspective on how Justice Scalia’s work
and example influenced me then and in the years that followed.
I attended law school only a few years in the aftermath of the 1987
confirmation battle against the originalist Judge Robert Bork, whose
appointment to the Supreme Court was narrowly defeated after a vicious
public campaign of character attacks, led by Senator Ted Kennedy among
others.44 Judge Bork was one of the most (if not the most) objectively
qualified individuals ever placed in nomination for the Court, and he was a
man of principle and integrity.45 The zeal with which Judge Bork’s

43. Robert P. George, Antonin Scalia: An American Originalist, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Feb.
16, 2016), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/02/16478. Justice Scalia alluded to a Biblical
passage encouraging followers of the newly-emerging Christian faith to persevere in a spirit of
humility while engaging a dominant culture that opposed them:
For I think that God has exhibited us apostles as last of all, as though sentenced to
death, because we have become a spectacle to the world, to angels and to mortals. We
are fools for the sake of Christ. . . . When reviled, we bless; when persecuted, we
endure; when slandered, we speak kindly.
1 Corinthians 4:9-12 (NRSV).
44. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 267-349 (1990) (documenting and discussing the nature, scope, and history of the campaign
against Judge Bork’s nomination to the Court).
45. This assessment was shared not only by Judge Bork’s supporters, see, e.g., Edwin Meese
III, The Double Standard in Judicial Selection, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 369, 370 (2007) (observing
that Judge Bork “was one of the most distinguished and qualified people ever nominated to the
Supreme Court: Yale law professor, leading scholar in antitrust and constitutional law, Solicitor
General of the United States, and a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit”), but also by prominent and fair-minded legal scholars who strongly disagreed
with his judicial philosophy:
[W]hen judged by normal personal and professional criteria, Robert Bork is among the
best qualified candidates for the Supreme Court of this or any other era. Few
nominees in our history compare with him in the range of their professional
accomplishments—as public servant, private practitioner, appellate judge, legal
scholar. Few compare in the seriousness of their lifelong engagement with the
fundamental questions of constitutional law. Of course, Bork’s answers to these
questions are controversial. But who can be surprised by that? Even those, like
myself, who disagree with Bork both can and should admire the way he has woven
theory and practice, reason and passion, into a pattern that expresses so eloquently our
deepest hopes for a life in the law. The Republic needs more people like Robert Bork.
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character was attacked was driven by ideologically partisan concerns that he
would join other Justices in overruling the 1973 Court opinion in Roe v.
Wade, which had found a constitutional right to abortion in the
unenumerated “penumbras” of its text, and had broadly swept away most
state laws that sought to protect unborn human lives.46 It was this very
vision of the Court’s role in American society that Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence has warned against so emphatically—that, in the absence of
firm grounding in the ratified Constitution or amendments adopted thereto,
a body of nine federal judges could and should remove such critical moral
questions from the states or the people. In so doing, the Court has
enormously raised the stakes for each nomination and confirmation of a
Justice, frequently turning the process into a political firestorm.
In 1990, the summer before I began law school, I studied Judge Bork’s
The Tempting of America, an outstanding book that sets out his approach to
constitutional interpretation based on original understanding and reviews
the Court’s history through this jurisprudential lens.47 I anticipated,
accurately, that my own views not only of law, but also of fundamental
moral questions and beliefs, would be in a distinct minority in my law
school, William & Mary. I nevertheless resolved to be myself as much as I
could, and to find others who shared my beliefs and values for support,
encouragement, and camaraderie. I also resolved to learn as well and as
much as I could from the faculty and fellow students who thought
differently, to hear their perspectives and analysis of the law, and to
maintain an open mind for the refining and transformation of my own ideas.
This was true not only in my Constitutional Law classes, but in many other
fora my legal education afforded me for such exchanges.
In a November 2015 talk at the University of St. Thomas Law School,
Justice Scalia said that he wrote his dissents “mainly for you guys, for law
students.”48 He hoped to mold and influence the next generation of lawyers
in the profession through his judicial philosophy and his arguments, and to
encourage them. I found this to be very true when I was a law student.
After my second year of law school, in the summer of 1992, the Court

It is a tragedy that the Republic should repay him for his decades of service by
publicly humiliating him.
Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1164 (1988).
46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973); see BORK, supra note 44, at 111-17, 337-43
(critiquing Roe and describing the outpouring of concern from Roe’s supporters that he would
overrule the decision if confirmed).
47. BORK, supra note 44.
48. Thomas Berg, Antonin Scalia: Devout Christian, Worldly Judge, CHRISTIANITY TODAY
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2016/february-web-only/antonin-scaliadevout-christian-worldly-judge.html.
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issued its ruling in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,49 re-affirming the central holding in Roe v. Wade.50 I was deeply
moved in sadness and disappointment by the Court’s decision not to
overrule Roe. I keenly felt the weight of the injustice I believed had been
done in an arena—the law—to which I was directing my education and
future professional life. Justice Scalia wrote a passionate and powerful
dissent in Casey,51 perhaps the most famous of the many opinions that
established his reputation as an emerging Great Dissenter.52 (This title has
also been bestowed on Justice John Marshall Harlan,53 who served on the
Court in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries and whose best
known dissent was in the 1896 decision Plessy v. Ferguson.54) Joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, Justice Scalia’s
brilliant Casey dissent mounted a scathing critique of the joint opinion’s
legal reasoning and its justifications for the application of stare decisis.55 It
also offered a compelling account, grounded in The Federalist Papers and
the founding constitutional framework, for why the federal judiciary was so
exceeding its bounds by foreclosing the ability of states to enact robust
protections for unborn human lives.56 I found his dissent to be not only
constitutionally convincing, but morally and emotionally cathartic. A
judicial figure as bright and as bold as Justice Scalia had responded to what
I believed to be a grave wrong in the law with words I wished I could have
49. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
52. See, e.g., Thomas F. Shea, The Great Dissenters: Parallel Currents in Holmes and
Scalia, 67 MISS. L.J. 397, 398 (1997) (observing that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who was the
first Justice to be described as a “great dissenter,” had “earned his sobriquet not by the volume of
his dissenting opinions, but by the fact that many of them, over the course of time, were adopted
as controlling authority by new majorities of Supreme Court Justices”; and opining that “[o]nly
time will tell whether the same outcome awaits the dissents of Justice Scalia, but a trend in that
direction may now be discerned.”); see generally SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT’S WITTIEST, MOST OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE (Kevin A. Ring ed., 2004).
53. See, e.g., ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT DISSENTS AND GREAT
DISSENTERS IN THE SUPREME COURT 32 (1974) (describing Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy as
“prophetic”); FRANK LATHAM, THE GREAT DISSENTER: SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN (1833-1911) at viii (1970) (describing Justice Harlan’s dissents as “miles
ahead of [Justice] Holmes”); see generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the
Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 800-01 (2000) (discussing the Plessy dissent and
“John Marshall Harlan the Elder”).
54. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (adopting the “separate but equal” rationale in
upholding the constitutionality of state laws imposing racial segregation); id. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s “separate but equal” rationale and stating “[o]ur constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens”).
55. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
56. Id.
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written myself, or joined with to form a majority of five, if only I were a
Justice of the Supreme Court.
I was comforted, I was inspired, and I hoped for the future.57
I graduated from law school in 1993. Living and practicing law for
seventeen years in a comparatively secular and “Blue State” like
Delaware58 and in a legal profession that tends to be quite “Blue” as well,59
I was all too aware my evangelical Christian faith and my political
conservatism would make me quite different than most of my superiors and
my peers, and looked down upon by some. However, each of these
distinctive traits was an essential element in my developing professional
identity. Although I made no secret of my worldviews and framework for
understanding life and the law, I exercised careful judgment about what to
express, to whom to express it, and on which occasions. But I was resolved
never to compromise my core values for the sake of conformity. When
speech, including in dissent, has been called for in the arising moment, I
have strived never to silence my conscience, but instead I have sought, with
good judgment, to offer the words I believe are needed. And when I was

57. Although Justice Scalia’s remaining tenure on the Court saw an occasional victory for
those dedicated to the protection of unborn human lives, see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007), and freedom of speech for those expressing pro-life viewpoints, see McCullen v. Coakley,
134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014), Roe and Casey have survived as precedents. Subsequent to Justice
Scalia’s passing, the Court decided a case that had been argued while he remained on the bench,
and by a vote of 5-3 struck down two provisions in a Texas health and safety statute regulating
abortion providers. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). Even with
Justice Scalia’s likely vote to uphold the statutory provisions, there would still have been a
majority of Justices willing to conclude that such basic government health and safety regulations
pertaining to abortion violate the United States Constitution. Now writing twenty-four years after
reading Justice Scalia’s Casey dissent, I remain hopeful for a future change in the Court’s
jurisprudence to overrule Roe v. Wade. But I have also begun to fear this may be a milestone of
legal justice I will not live to see fully realized.
58. See Frank Newport, New Hampshire Now Least Religious State in U.S., GALLUP (Feb.
4, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/189038/new-hampshire-least-religious-state.aspx (reporting
2015 polling results showing Delaware ranked thirty-third among the states in religiosity, with
North Dakota ranking seventeenth); Jeffrey M. Jones, Red States Outnumber Blue for First Time
in Gallup Tracking, GALLUP (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/188969/red-statesoutnumber-blue-first-time-gallup-tracking.aspx (reporting 2015 polling results showing Delaware
as the thirteenth most Democratic state, with North Dakota ranking as the fourth most Republican
state).
59. See Adam Liptak, Legal Group’s Neutrality Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/us/31bar.html?_r=0 (observing the American Bar
Association “takes public and generally liberal positions on all sorts of divisive issues,” and
“studies suggest that [judicial] candidates nominated by Democratic presidents fare better in the
group’s ratings than those nominated by Republicans”); see also Russell G. Pearce, The Legal
Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1364 (2006) (concluding that “[a] legal profession identified with the
Blue State vision of excluding values from the public square has little to contribute if the public
square is inevitably full of value conflict and debate,” and that “[t]he legal profession . . . must
abandon the Blue State rhetoric if it is to play a leading role in helping transform value conflicts
from culture wars to civil and respectful disagreement”).
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privileged to join the faculty of this School of Law in 2010, this
commitment did not change, nor will it ever.
V. A CALL FOR FREEDOM
One may come to understand much about the strength (or weakness) of
a society and a culture from the way that it treats minority and dissenting
views on matters of significance. In the years since I graduated from law
school, and especially in the last decade, it has been disheartening to see
growing efforts to restrict, or to chill into silence, viewpoints that are
opposed by a majority, or by a strong plurality or minority faction that
claims either a legal or a moral right to suppress the speech of others.60
Most sadly, this trend has been highly pronounced in colleges and
universities, the very institutions that should be the most dedicated to
promoting open marketplaces for ideas.61 Around the country, it has
become all too common to encounter not only students, but also faculty and
school administrators, promoting policies of increasing campus censorship
(whether de jure or de facto) of ideas or speakers they disfavor.62 It has
also become all too common to hear about intimidating tactics and
suppression of the speech of those whose opinions are contrary to the
general will of the campus academic subculture and the viewpoints it may
prefer.63 In our national political culture, it has become too common for
figures who lead emerging majorities or similarly powerful factions to
pronounce that the time for debate is over, and that those who have opposed
them must either be silent or suffer retribution for their speech.64 And even

60. This phenomenon is hardly a new one in the United States. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL,
INSIDE AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE DECLINE, THE DECEPTION, THE DOGMAS 174-201 (1993)
(chapter on “Ideological Double Standards” for expression by faculty, students, and guest
speakers at American colleges and universities). But commentators both right-of-center, see, e.g.,
MARY KATHARINE HAM & GUY BENSON, END OF DISCUSSION: HOW THE LEFT’S OUTRAGE
INDUSTRY SHUTS DOWN DEBATE, MANIPULATES VOTERS, AND MAKES AMERICA LESS FREE
(AND FUN) (2015), and left-of-center, see, e.g., KIRSTEN POWERS, THE SILENCING: HOW THE
LEFT IS KILLING FREE SPEECH (2015), have expressed serious concerns about recent trends and
justifications offered for seeking to silence disfavored conservative or religious viewpoints, and
even punishing those who express or act on the basis of such convictions.
61. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The Glaring Evidence That Free Speech Is Threatened on
Campus, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/theglaring-evidence-that-free-speech-is-threatened-on-campus/471825; Greg Lukianoff, Campus
Free Speech Has Been in Trouble for a Long Time, CATO UNBOUND (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/01/04/greg-lukianoff/campus-free-speech-has-been-troublelong-time.
62. See Friedersdorf, supra note 61; Lukianoff, supra note 61.
63. See Friedersdorf, supra note 61; Lukianoff, supra note 61.
64. See POWERS, supra note 60, at 1-20, 49-67 (chapters entitled “Repressive Tolerance”
and “Illiberal Intolerance and Intimidation”); id. at 21 (“In the illiberal attack on free speech,
victory is silence. Any person who dissents from the illiberal left’s settled dogma is viewed as an
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as technology has made possible more avenues for social communication
and exchanges of ideas than ever before, we see persons who express
disfavored viewpoints increasingly being subject to swarming and
aggressive online and social media attacks (including sometimes threats of
physical or financial harm) in retaliation for speaking their mind.65
Whether the prevailing ideas are liberal or conservative, left or right, the
urges and actions to silence disagreement about ideas are absolutely wrong,
and terribly contrary to our founding constitutional principles and our
American traditions.
But with full awareness of those very concerning national trends, I
continue to act in faith and with full confidence in our own leadership and
institutional environment at the University of North Dakota School of Law,
and the strong support that exists here for academic freedom and for
freedom of speech. This is why I am so enthusiastic about our student
chapters of the Federalist Society and the American Constitution Society, as
well as other student organizations, and about the opportunity events like
today’s “Buzz” session give us to express and hear points of view we
otherwise might not. This School of Law’s support for genuine freedom of
speech and for genuine viewpoint diversity should be celebrated; but it
should also never be taken for granted. Its endurance in the long term
depends in very significant ways on a critical mass of fair-minded people
being willing, on principle, to accept that there will be divergence and
enemy to be delegitimized, demonized, and dismissed.”). As Professor Stephen L. Carter has
observed:
[F]or whatever movement holds sway over the apparatus of the secular sovereign,
loyalty is defined as allegiance and, all too often, allegiance as agreement; to dispute
the political program of the moment is to be un-American. It is as though we have
forgotten the advice of James Madison in Federalist No. 10, that “the first object of
government” is to protect our ability to reach different conclusions, because the
alternative is to create a society in which every citizen holds “the same opinions, the
same passions, and the same interests.”
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND
LOYALTY 16 (1998).
65. See, e.g., Madeline Buckley, Threat Tied to RFRA Prompt[s] Indiana Pizzeria to Close
Its Doors, INDYSTAR (Apr. 3, 2015, 4:33 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/2015/04/02/
threats-tied-rfra-prompt-indiana-pizzeria-close-doors/70847230 (recounting online attacks made
against Memories Pizza in Indiana, including threats of violence, in response to its owner’s
answers to a television news reporter’s hypothetical question, posed during a controversy over the
state’s recently adopted religious freedom statute, about whether her pizzeria would cater a samesex wedding if requested); HAM & BENSON, supra note 60, at 219-36 (recounting stories of
retaliation against individuals for their speech and religious convictions relating to same-sex
marriage, including how the discovery of a 2008 donation in support of the successful California
Proposition 8 led to demands, from employees and activist groups, that Mozilla CEO Brendan
Eich renounce his convictions on the issue or be fired by the board of directors; Eich, who is
Catholic, refused to do so and then resigned); POWERS, supra note 60, at 11-12 (more details
about the social media campaign attacking Eich); see also EBERSTADT, supra note 21, at 44-69
(chapter entitled “Acclaiming ‘Diversity’ vs. Hounding the Heretics”).
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disagreement about matters of great consequence, and that conformity of
thought is not the price of admission to a conversation. It requires people of
courage and resolve doing the most that they can to ensure that we do not
go down the path other institutions of higher education have been traveling,
including, in recent times, some law schools.66 I am fully resolved to be
vigilant about academic freedom and freedom of speech at the University of
North Dakota School of Law, both for faculty and for students, and to
always be ready to make the case to ensure these core First Amendment
values continue to be protected not only in theory but in practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is my sincere hope that, whether your own beliefs and convictions
have some things in common with mine or are completely different, you
will look for opportunities to listen to and learn from others in the law, and
to grow from those engagements. In doing this over the course of my now
almost twenty-three years in the legal profession, I have seen my views in
important respects either change from what they had been or become deeper
and more resolutely held as foundational principles. But I also beseech you
not to allow the sway of opinions that may be popular among your
professors or your peers to turn you from your beliefs or convictions, or

66. See, e.g., Luke Milligan, UofL Law School Is No Longer Neutral, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Jan. 17, 2016, 4:11 PM), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2016/01/13/commentaryuofl-law-school-no-longer-neutral/78655014 (law school faculty member critiquing the University
of Louisville Brandeis School of Law’s recently adopted program of “ideological branding,”
identifying itself as a “compassionate” law school favoring “progressive values” and “social
justice,” and with a new 1L-student orientation that “left students wondering if they’d need to
sacrifice personal privacy, political values, and deeply held religious convictions in order to
succeed at law school”); see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez,
561 U.S. 661 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Thomas) (responding to the majority opinion’s upholding the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law’s refusal to register a Christian Legal Society student organization,
purportedly because the required statements of faith and community life for its leaders and
members violated an “accept-all-comers policy”: “The proudest boast of our free speech
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’ Today’s
decision rests on a very different principle: no freedom for expression that offends prevailing
standards of political correctness in our country’s institutions of higher learning.”) (quoting United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); Nationwide: “Allcomers” Policies Jeopardize Free Association, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Apr.
2, 2013), https://www.thefire.org/cases/nationwide-all-comers-policies-jeopardize-free-association
(collecting articles on recent campus controversies involving “all-comers” policies and state
legislative responses to protect First Amendment freedom of speech and association); cf. Adam
Steinbaugh, After Harvard Law School Reaffirms Commitment to Free Speech, a ‘Little Sign War’
Erupts, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.thefire.org/afterharvard-law-school-reaffirms-commitment-to-free-speech-a-little-sign-war-erupts (recounting a
controversy at Harvard Law School in which “Reclaim Harvard Law,” a group of law students
who had occupied for six weeks and renamed a lounge in the student center, tore down signs
posted in the lounge by another student who objected to their occupation).
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cause you to be silent, simply because you are or perceive yourself to be in
the minority. Stand firmly for what you believe, treat others who disagree
with you with kindness and respect (even if they do not always reciprocate),
and look for occasions that may come to you—often unexpectedly and
without warning, as Justice Scalia’s passing was for me to speak and act
for your ideas and your convictions.

